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Background
• Sparing Assessment
– Prior to Shuttle retirement, spares 
had already been purchased and 
pre-positioned on-orbit to meet the 
critical ISS functional requirements 
to the previously expected life of 
2015. 
– Currently, an annual assessment  is 
performed to estimate the number of 
spares needed to keep the 
International Space Station (ISS) 
operational until 2020 (and beyond).
– Historically, the Spares Assessment 
has not included all uncertainty, 
specifically epistemic (lack of 
knowledge).
• Propose Methodologies to 
Supplement Sparing Assessment
– Characterize and quantify
uncertainty, at the Orbital 
Replacement Unit (ORU) level.
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Problem Statement
There are two general shortcomings to the current annual sparing 
assessment:
1. The vehicle functions are currently assessed according to ‘confidence 
targets,’ which can be misleading- overly conservative or optimistic.
2. The current confidence levels are arbitrarily determined and do not 
account for epistemic uncertainty (lack of knowledge) in the ORU failure 
rate.
– There are two major categories of uncertainty that impact Sparing 
Assessment:
• Aleatory Uncertainty: Natural variability in distribution of actual 
failures around an Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)
• Epistemic Uncertainty : Lack of knowledge about the true value of an 
Orbital Replacement Unit’s (ORU) MTBF
We propose an approach to revise confidence targets and account 
for both categories of uncertainty, an approach we call Probability 
and Confidence Trade-space (PACT) evaluation.
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Current Process Flow
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Current Model of ISS Sparing Risk
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PACT: Proposed Process Flow
PACT
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PACT Model of ISS Sparing Risk
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Benefits of the PACT
• Using this model we can now say- ‘we are n% confident that the 
ORU has m% probability of sufficiency through year xxxx.’
• With this knowledge, we can assess the tradeoff along the curve 
between the desirable ORU Probability of Sufficiency (POS) value
and our confidence in the value. 
– Decision options:
1. We may accept the probability and our confidence as is.
2. We may relax our confidence for a higher desirable POS value, or we may 
consider a lower desirable POS value in favor of  a higher confidence level.
Alternately, we may influence the ORU POS and confidence estimates by assuming additional 
spares or by changing the projected horizon time for the analysis. 
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Testing PACT: Generic Example
Figure shows what number of ‘events’ sparing quantities should cover to meet the 
targets: 90/90 TARGET: 1.36 events, 75/75 TARGET: 1.02 events, 60/60 TARGET: 
0.91 events
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Summary
• When introducing PACT Evaluation, we define the epistemic 
uncertainty characterizing ISS sparing assessments. We hereby 
acknowledge what we can realistically know about an ORU’s true 
failure rate given the various methods used to predict ORU 
reliability.
• Preliminary results indicate a valuable trade space for selecting 
optimal targets and identifying the confidence associated with the 
target.
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Backup
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Forward Work
1. Extend the methodology to evaluate spare allocations for systems 
and functions to assure a desirable POS and confidence level for 
short term and long term trade-off
2. Develop the capability to optimize resources while assuring a 
desirable POS and confidence level 
3. Evaluate robust techniques for determining desirable POS values 
and associated confidence levels and for handling different plausible 
error factors in component uncertainties
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Testing PACT: Case Study
• Objective: Selection represents a variety of ISS supportability challenges/risk 
impacting sparing levels
– Demonstrates a breadth of uncertainty: empirical basis of ORU failure rate demonstrated versus 
lack of operational experience
• Case Study: 6 ORUs were analyzed in detail to understand the utilization of the 
proposed process
– Remote Power Control Mechanism (RPCM T5 Ext) – large population of installed units and 
spares providing rich operational experience including failures and redesign
– Improved Payload Ethernet Hub Gateway (IPEHG) – small internal ORU, no operational 
experience
– Pump Module Assembly (PMA) – large external ORU, critical hardware with many hours of 
operation and a random failure
– Hydrogen Dome – large internal ORU, no redundancy, relatively little operational experience
– Solar Array Rotary Joint Drive Lock Assembly Drive Lock Assembly (SARJ-DLA) – external 
ORUs with redundancy, similar function differing failure rates, SARJ DLA modeled in the Usable 
Power function hierarchy
– Thermal Radiator Rotary Joint Drive Lock Assembly Drive Lock Assembly (TRRJ-DLA) –
external ORUs with redundancy, similar function differing failure rates, TRRJ DLA modeled as a 
separate ORU
• Statistics: 
– The posterior error factor range for entire ISS population of ORUs: 1.36 – 4.00
– ORU failure rate range: 1.98E-12 to 3.5E-4 failures/yr
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PACT Analyses Results
Note: High confidence targets are based on the minimum system configuration for each ORU. 
The proposed approach will be useful in re-evaluating the POS and identifying a reasonable 
confidence target.
ORU Name MTBF Installed Quantity kF
Duty 
Cycle
Total Expected 
Number of 
Failures 
through 2020 
Current 
Number 
of 
Spares 
Posterio
r Error 
Factor
POS 
through 
2020 
Confidence 
at POS 
RPCM T5 Ext 268,443 36 1.2 1 12.69 18 1.36 95% 54%
Improved 
Payload 
Ethernet Hub 
Gateway 
(IPEHG)
50,719 3 1.31 1 6.11 3 4 15% 66%
Pump Module 
Assembly 
(PMA)
69,065 2 1.2 1 2.74 4 2.87 86% 63%
Hydrogen Dome 49,853 1 1.3 1 2.06 4 4 95% 66%
SARJ Drive 
Lock Assembly 
(SARJ-DLA)
278,241 4 1.2 0.5 0.68 2 4 97% 66%
TRRJ Drive 
Lock Assembly 
(TRRJ-DLA)
353,926 4 1.2 0.5 0.53 1 4 90% 66%
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Results: RPCM Type V Ext
Confidence and Probability of Sufficiency through 2020
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Results: IPEHG
Confidence and Probability of Sufficiency through 2020
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Pump Module
Confidence and Probability of Sufficiency through 2020
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Hydrogen Dome
Confidence and Probability of Sufficiency through 2020
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SARJ DLA
Confidence and Probability of Sufficiency through 2020
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TRRJ DLA
Confidence and Probability of Sufficiency through 2020
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Acronyms
Acronym Description
CT Confidence Target
EF Error Factor
IPEHG Improved Payload Ethernet Hub Gateway
ISS International Space Station
kF K Factor
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure
ORU Orbital Replacement Unit
PACT Probability and Confidence Trade-space
POS Probability of Sufficiency
PMA Pump Module Assembly
PT Probability Target
RPCM Remote Power Control Mechanism
SARJ DLA Solar Array Rotary Joint Drive Lock Assembly
TRRJ DLA Thermal Radiator Rotary Joint Drive Lock Assembly
